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9.1  Separation as an increasingly important issue 
Over the course of their lives, a substantial minority of elderly European men and 
women  have  experienced  the  dissolution  of  one  or  more  partner  relationships 
through divorce or the ending of cohabitation. So far, most research into the eco-
nomic consequences of (marital) separation has been based on panel data and con-
sequently focuses on the short or middle term for the current generations of re-
spondents in their ‘adult’ years. This chapter makes a start at improving existing 
knowledge by studying the economic consequences of (marital) separation, look-
ing at this issue ‘from the other way around’. Using retrospective SHARELIFE-
data, we explore how wealth in later life – measured in terms of home-ownership 
and the possession of other financial assets – is influenced by the relationship tra-
jectories of European men and women. Given the complexity of the issue at hand, 
in this chapter we focus on the first marital separation. As for the variation be-
tween European countries in terms of the institutional arrangements influencing 
the  short  and  long-term  consequences  of  (marital)  separation,  we  furthermore 
sketch the contours of a conceptual framework that can be used for a more in-
depth study. 
Although in recent years the economic consequences of (marital) separation 
have been the topic of a fair amount of publications, most authors have concen-
trated on the short or middle-term impact of this life event. The results of these 
studies for different European countries are fairly consistent: while many divorced 
women become financially deprived and/or even end up claiming welfare, for men 
the financial consequences of divorce are usually less negative – controlling for 
the size and the composition of their new household, some men even experience 
an improvement of their disposable income. These gender differences can be re-
lated to the gender division of labour, the gender differences in labour market par-
ticipation and male-female wage differentials. From a comparative perspective, 
Uunk (2004) has shown that in countries providing either high public childcare 
and/or generous transfers for lone parents, the short-term economic consequences 
of divorce are less severe. Furthermore, not all women follow the same income 
trajectory during the years following divorce. According to Andreß et al. (2006), 
British and German women, although they suffer more initially, recover rather 
quickly from the negative economic consequences of separation, perhaps because 
their economic situation forces them to repartner more quickly. In Sweden how-2  
ever, where gender equality in terms of a comparatively smaller income loss fol-
lowing separation is most pronounced, both men and women seem to financially 
suffer for a longer period of time. This might be an indication that in the longer 
term the incomes of separated women gradually recover, though not always to 
their previous levels. The mechanisms by which the initial decline in household 
income following (marital) separation is mainly countered are paid work and/or 
repartnering. Across Europe, women who repartner experience a 26%-increase of 
their post-divorce income, while women who enter the labour market gain 19% 
(Dewilde and Uunk 2008). 
This focus on (women’s) income position has resulted in a somewhat one-sided 
view of the economic consequences of (marital) separation. In addition to the fi-
nancial  consequences,  divorce  entails  significant  additional  economic  changes. 
Perhaps the main other economic impact concerns the housing situation of the ex-
partners. By definition, the dissolution of the couple results in two separate house-
holds, of which at least one has to find another place to live. Setting up a new 
household comes at a substantial cost, and in particular for those people at the 
lower end of the income distribution, finding new housing which is both afford-
able and meets certain quality standards is a difficult task. Likewise, the partner 
who remains in the marital home often has to provide for the full mortgage or rent 
payments, which can cause severe financial strain and/or result in moving away. 
Many respondents, especially women, have difficulties coping with housing costs 
and maintenance, or find that they do not manage to raise the capital necessary to 
buy their ex-partner’s interest in the house. 
Comparative  research  on  the  housing  consequences  of  (marital)  separation 
(Dewilde 2008, 2009) shows that in the short-term, this life event substantially 
raises housing costs, as well as the risk of leaving owner-occupation for both men 
and women. This risk seems however smaller for women in those countries where 
the  economic  consequences  of  divorce  are  more  severe,  i.e.  in  the  liberal  and 
Southern-European welfare regimes. This finding might be explained by the fact 
that  women in these countries  might be compensated for the economic conse-
quences  of  divorce  by  more  advantageous  procedures  of  property  settlement. 
However, other explanations are possible as well. In the Southern-European coun-
tries, outright ownership is more common and part of the ‘extended family enter-
prise’, which makes it easier to remain in owner-occupation. Furthermore, alterna-
tive  forms of housing are limited, so that divorced  men and  women  might be 
forced to stay in owner-occupation, even if they cannot afford it.  
9.2  In the long term 
Concerning the long-term consequences of (marital) separation, our first hypothe-
sis is that both men and women who ever experienced the dissolution of a mar-
riage or cohabitation are less likely to be a home-owner and have a lower level of 3 
financial assets in old age, even when they have eventually repartnered. This ef-
fect is caused by three underlying mechanisms. The first mechanism relates to the 
event  of  (marital)  separation  itself.  As  the  previous  section  has  shown,  across 
Europe (marital) separation results in a decline of disposable household income 
(especially when taking housing costs into account) for a usually extended period 
of time, and in the exit out of owner-occupation. We also expect to find a gender 
difference in the impact of (marital) separation in old age. The second mechanism 
is  related  to  the  well-known  beneficial  effect  of  marriage.  Wilmoth  and  Koso 
(2002) found that marriage, as the institutionalised way of cohabiting, offers more 
opportunities  for  welfare accumulation compared to other living arrangements. 
Thirdly, especially in so-called home-ownership countries, owner-occupation is 
heavily  subsidised  through  tax  credits,  benefiting  average-  and  high-income 
households.  Moreover,  during  the  post-war  decades,  most  European  countries 
have experienced a more or less sustained increase in house prices, making owner-
occupation a relatively safe and profitable investment. To the extent that renters 
do not enjoy the same financial benefits, the event of exiting owner-occupation in 
itself following (marital) separation simply puts separated men and women in a 
position where they can accumulate less wealth. 
9.3   The Importance of Institutions 
The impact of divorce obviously depends on the social context. A historical and 
comparative perspective is therefore important. In this section we single out two 
dimensions: the welfare state and the legal traditions concerning the division of 
marital  property.  Furthermore,  as  the  respondents  in  the  SHARELIFE-module 
grew up, established their families and bought their homes in different time peri-
ods, we have to take into account that processes and mechanisms of wealth accu-
mulation (both housing wealth and other financial wealth), as well as the impact of 
(marital) separation on these, might be different for different birth cohorts. There-
fore, in our analyses we distinguish between respondents born from 1900 to 1934, 
from 1935 to 1944 and from 1945 onwards. 
Concerning the possibly mitigating influence of the welfare state on the impact 
of (marital) separation on wealth in old age, we expect that female labour market 
participation  can  be  regarded  as  a  reflection  of  the  opportunity  structure  for 
women. This is influenced by welfare state interventions in matters like public 
child care and maternity benefits, but also by education and legislation towards 
non-discrimination at the work place. Of course, cultural and economic factors are 
also important. In our empirical analysis, we use the female labour market partici-
pation rate in 1980 as a kind of 'catch-all' contextual variable for this opportunity 
structure. This choice is mainly motivated by the lack of data on specific welfare 
state interventions in the earlier decades for all countries. In any case, we expect 
that women in countries with high female labour market participation are more 4  
likely to be economically independent, and therefore suffer less  from  negative 
consequences on their wealth after separation. 
A second institutional domain we at least want to draw attention to concerns 
the legal customs related to the division of marital property. So far, this domain 
has remained a black box, and is not often addressed by sociologists. From a com-
parative perspective however, laws and legal customs potentially have a large im-
pact on the effect of marital separation on wealth in old age. Issues such as com-
pensation for the ‘wronged’ spouse in terms of facilitating ownership of the family 
home or the sharing of pension rights have a large impact on economic well-being 
and the possibilities for wealth accumulation for both separated men and women. 
Furthermore, the change from bilateral to unilateral divorce laws might have an 
impact on the economic outcomes in later life remains. These questions however 
remain unanswered up to today as research is still scant on these issues.  
9.4  Data and Variables 
The  data  used  in  this  chapter  are  based  on  the  marital  histories  collected  in 
SHARELIFE. These retrospective data are then combined with the prospective 
data collected during the second wave of SHARE. The main reason for combining 
the SHARELIFE data with the second wave of SHARE is that the dependent vari-
ables  we  use  as  indicators  for  economic  well-being  were  not  collected  in 
SHARELIFE. The data refer to the life histories of 28,573 respondents in 13 coun-
tries (Austria, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, 
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Poland and the Czech Republic). Using listwise de-
letion, cases with missing information on the variables of interest were removed 
from the sample, producing an analytical sample that contained a total of 20,711 
respondents, including 4,552 currently singles and 16,159 currently married or co-
habiting individuals. In the following paragraphs we discuss our main variables 
and our analysis strategy.  
Dependent Variables 
Our analyses focus on home-ownership and the total net worth (i.e. wealth) of 
SHARELIFE-respondents. Home-ownership as recorded in the second wave of 
SHARE is measured as a dichotomous variable, coded 0 if a respondent does not 
own the house he or she occupies at the time of interview and coded 1 if he or she 
does. The total net worth is the sum of the net values of: (a) the primary residence 
net of the mortgage, (b) other real estate, (c) business, (d) cars, (e) savings, stocks 
and bonds, mutual funds, IRA’s and life insurances. Imputations on net worth are 
provided in the SHARE-data to correct for missing values. This net worth is ex-
pressed in PPP-adjusted Euros. It is important to note that in SHARE net worth is 
measured at the household level. This is problematic for our analysis since it im-5 
plies that net worth is confounded with current marital status. For couples, the to-
tal net worth represents the wealth of two adults, whereas for singles it reflects the 
wealth of one adult. Given our goal of estimating the effect of individuals’ marital 
histories on their economic well-being in later life, we need to adjust for this by 
creating a per capita measure of total net worth as dependent variable. To do so we 
assign half of the total household net worth to each partner by dividing the house-
hold level wealth by the number of people living in the household. After inspec-
tion of the data we applied a logarithmic transformation of our dependent variable, 
net worth, to correct for the non-normal distribution. To avoid the loss of respon-
dents with negative or zero net worth values, we added a constant to the total 
wealth distribution to anchor the  minimum  value at 1 before applying the log 
transformation. Using the logged net worth changes the interpretation of the con-
tinuous coefficients, which can now be interpreted as percentage changes. Dummy 
variables, however, cannot easily be interpreted as percentage changes. Following 
Halvorsen  and  Palmquist  (1980),  the  coefficients  for  the  dummy  variables  are 
transformed by taking the antilog of the coefficient, subtracting 1 from this antilog 
and multiplying the result by 100 to obtain percentage changes. 
Independent Variables 
Since the main goal of this study is to examine the long-term effect of different 
marital trajectories on economic well-being, we created marital status categories 
based on the current marital status and the previous marriage dissolutions and re-
marriages. The two possible current marital statuses are married/cohabiting or sin-
gle. Non-cohabiting couples were grouped in with singles (236 respondents). We 
grouped respondents that are married, but living separated from their spouses, in 
with married respondents (22 respondents). Grouping the currently married or co-
habiting individuals according to their marital history results in four categories: 
(1)  the  continuously  married/cohabiting  (reference),  (2)  individuals  who  never 
married, (3) remarried after experiencing at least one divorce, and (4) cohabiting 
after experiencing at least one divorce. We distinguish between three categories of 
singles: (5) never married, (6) single after experiencing at least one divorce and 
(7)  single  following  widowhood.  We  excluded  individuals  who  experienced  a 
combination of widowhood and divorces (329 respondents) and individuals who 
remarried or cohabited after the death of a partner because of the small sample 
numbers (350 respondents). We also excluded the individuals for whom we could 
not identify marital history (751 respondents) and those who cohabited but never 
married (181 respondents). Note that this reconstruction of marital history does 
take into account neither the sequence nor the number of dissolutions. Another 
important note is that the results for the groups of cohabiting divorcees and wid-
ows and widowers should be interpreted with caution because of the small num-
bers. 6  
The institutional effects of the different welfare states are estimated using the 
percentage of female labour-force participation in all countries in 1980, the earli-
est year for which we have data for all countries (ILO, 2010). 
Control Variables 
In all models we control for age, age squared, birth cohort (1900-1934, 1935-
1944, 1945-…), education (Low, Medium, High), subjective health (Very Good to 
Excellent, Less than Very Good), number of chronic diseases, number of living 
children, number of siblings, the degree of urbanisation, and the European region 
one is living in: (1) North (Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands); (2) West (Aus-
tria, Germany, Belgium, France, Switzerland); (3) South (Spain, Italy, Greece); 
and (4) East (Poland, Czech Republic) as dummy variables. 
9.5  Results 
Let us first look at the distribution of the sample across marital history categories. 
Figure 1 shows that a large proportion of our sample is still in their first marriage 
(66 percent overall). 30 percent experienced a marital dissolution, while 4 percent 
never  married  or  cohabited.  The  dominant  reason  for  marital  dissolution  for 
women born before 1945 and men born before 1935 is widowhood; for later co-
horts divorce becomes more important, which reflects the increasing divorce rates 
since the 1960s. Among men, about half of the divorcees are currently remarried 
(53 percent), while 33 percent is currently single and 13 percent found a new part-
ner, but did not remarry. Among female divorcees, the proportion that is still sin-
gle is much larger. About 55 percent is still single after experiencing a divorce. 
While the number of women who cohabits after divorce is quite comparable to 
that of men (10 percent), the number of remarried women is relatively small (34 
percent).  
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What is the impact of marital history on the rate of home-ownership? Unsurpris-
ingly, Figure 2 shows that continuous marriage or cohabiting is most conducive to 
ownership; people who never married are less often owner-occupiers. People who 
experienced a marital dissolution are also less often owner-occupiers. The interest-
ing result is that among those who eventually remarried or entered cohabitation, 
the rate of ownership is still about 15 percentage points lower, compared to those 
who never experienced marital dissolution. Those who were owner-occupier but 
remained single after divorce are less likely to be owner-occupier afterwards. This 
probably reflects the fact that divorce implies that at least one partner has to move 
and is thus at risk of exiting home-ownership. In general, there is not much differ-
ence between men and women, except for divorcees who are now single, where 
women appear to fare worse than men. 
 


























The patterns are a bit less clear when we look at net wealth (Figure 3). Among 
men and women, individuals who never married enjoy about the same mean level 
of net wealth as persons who are still in their first marriage. Divorcees who remar-
ried or started cohabiting have a slightly lower mean level of net worth, although 
the difference is not statistically significant. Individuals who remain single after 
divorce possess low levels of wealth, and this is clearly true for women. Men who 
were confronted with the death of the partner and remained single have a higher 
mean net worth than women in the same situation, and have a higher mean net 
worth than continuously married individuals. Of course, these results could be due 
to selection effects, or cohort or country differences, which is why we now turn to 
the regression results. 
 
Figure 9.3:  Mean (geometric) net worth per person in PPP adjusted euro, by gender  























In the regressions we model the natural log of wealth per capita (implying that the 
regression coefficients can be interpreted as percentage changes), controlling for 
age, age squared, birth cohort, education, subjective health, number of chronic 
diseases, number of living children, number of siblings, the degree of urbanisa-
tion, and the European region one is living in. Regressions are performed for men 
and women separately, and by European region. Given the focus of this chapter, 
we only plot the coefficients for the marital history dummies in Figure 4a en Fig-
ure 4b. The reference category refers to the people who are continuously married. 
For the models with home-ownership as dependent variable we use logistic re-
gression, but otherwise the model is the same. 
Since confidence intervals are large, relative to the estimated coefficients, we 
must be careful when drawing conclusions. First, in general, marital dissolution 
has a negative impact (if any) on net wealth and the chance to be a home-owner. 
Divorcees – both men and women – who remain single, seem to suffer most. The 
impact is much reduced, and sometimes wholly eliminated, when divorcees re-
marry. Widowhood seems less disadvantageous than divorce, probably because it 
does not involve dividing up the assets between partners. In the Northern coun-
tries, the impact of marital dissolution is about the same for men and women. This 
could be due to the higher labour market participation of women in the Scandina-
vian countries. In the countries of the West (AS, BE, DE, FR), by contrast, divorce 
and widowhood seem to have a larger impact for women than for men. Coefficient 
point estimates indicate that these life events seem to have especially negative ef-
fects on net wealth for women in the South. For those countries, and also for those 
of the East, the small number of people in the samples who experienced divorce 
makes it difficult to identify these effects.  
 10  
Figure 9.4a:   Impact of marital history categories, relative to those continuously married, on 
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Figure 9.4b:   Impact of marital history categories, relative to those continuously married, on 
  net wealth (log), net of control variables, by gender and region (regression  
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Above, we hypothesised that high female labour market participation would be a 
variable capturing welfare state influences that may mitigate the impact of marital 
dissolution for women. In order to test this hypothesis, we estimated separate re-11 
gressions for each country (for women only), and plotted the coefficient estimates 
for the categories ‘divorced, single’ and ‘divorced, remarried’ against the female 
labour market participation rate in 1980. Figure 5 shows the results for net wealth 
(for home-ownership no relationship emerges in the plots). As regards the coeffi-
cient for the category ‘divorced, remarried’ (5b), we see no pattern. When consid-
ering the impact on net wealth of being ‘divorced, single’ (5a), relative to being 
continuously married, it seems that in countries where labour market participation 
is  high, e.g. Sweden, this effect is small. When labour  market participation is 
lower, the impact can be much more substantial (e.g. Germany, Italy), but it can 
also be quite limited (e.g. Spain). The latter may be due to an ‘elitist’ pattern of 
divorce, where only women who can afford to do so, having sufficient income of 
their own, take the step to a marital separation. In any case, the possible impact of 
this and other context variables needs to be analysed in a more rigorous way. 
 
Figure 9.5a:   Impact of divorce on net wealth of being divorced and single, by female  
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Figure 9.5b:  Impact of divorce on net wealth of being divorced and remarried, by female 
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9.6   Conclusion 
The goal of this study was to examine the impact of marital dissolution at some 
point during the the life course, particularly divorce, on the wealth of elderly peo-
ple in Europe. A secondary aim was to assess whether the impact of different 
marital trajectories would differ across the different welfare state regimes. Our 
analyses indicate that persons who experienced a divorce have less wealth and 
lower  chances  of  being  home-owners  than  continuously  married  persons.  Al-
though remarried and cohabiting individuals who have ever experienced a divorce 
have higher levels of wealth and higher chances of owning the house they are liv-
ing in, compared to single individuals, we find a lasting effect in old age of marital 
separation in many countries. This is an interesting result, which could only be ob-
tained by looking at the life histories of individuals. Most research on this topic to 
date has only considered current marital status, and few studies have looked at the 
long-term consequences of marital dissolution.  
In many countries, but not all, we find larger effects of marital dissolution for 
women than for men, as expected. We also found mixed support for our hypothe-
sis that there would be large differences between European countries in the impact 
of marital separation on the wealth of elderly. However, the differences are not 
easily interpretable in terms of welfare state typologies, or specific welfare state 
interventions.  While  the  hypothesised  mitigating  effect  of  high  female  labour 
market  participation  emerged  to  some  extent  from  the  results,  more  work  is 
needed to identify such effects with a reasonable degree of certainty. 13 
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